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Abstract
Merger and acquisitions (M&As) have been an important tool for reorganizing the European
market since the establishment of European Economic and Monetary Union. This paper
suggests that European integration helped and encouraged European firms to source technology
across national borders in Europe, establishing European innovative firms. The figures confirm
that, once barriers impeding the free movement of capital, goods and labor had fallen, European
firms used M&As intensively to enter foreign European markets. Enhancing technology
competencies is found to be one of the main motives for cross-border acquisitions in the 1990s
but is not a factor in domestic acquisitions over the same period.
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1 Introduction
The entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 was an important step for
strengthening the European Economic Union. The treaty paved the way for
European Monetary Union and set up the transition of the European
Community towards a single integrated market. Most existing technical,
regulatory, legal, bureaucratic, and protectionist barriers were eliminated to
make  way  for  the  free  movement  of  goods,  capital  and  labor.  One  of  the
expected benefits of the common market and single currency was to spur
innovation and to foster the emergence of innovative firms which operate across
European borders. Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) across borders were an
important way for firms to respond to the incentives set by the establishment of
the integrated market. This paper investigates how innovativeness affected
merger activity in the European market after 1993.
Economically, the deepening of the European Economic Union and the
agreement on a roadmap for monetary union can be seen as a shock to the
economic environment as it changed the optimal factor allocation in European
markets. The dismantling of barriers to the free movement of goods, capital and
labor made some assets less productive in their current use than they would be
in  an  alternative  use.  M&As  are  an  important  and  fast  means  of  rearranging
productive assets towards equilibrium (Hall, 1988a; Jovanovic and Rousseau,
2002, 2004). M&As were therefore, unsurprisingly, central in the European
restructuring process following the implementation of the various single market
directives. Subsequent national and European Union (EU) deregulation
measures made national borders increasingly obsolete (WIR, 2000; Kleinert and
Klodt, 2000; Sleuwaegen and Valentini, 2006; Torstensson, 1999).
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3
This paper contributes to the debate by empirically investigating merger
activity in Europe in the first few years after the adoption of the Maastricht
Treaty in 1993, which laid the groundwork for economic and monetary union in
the  EU.  We  especially  assess  whether  the  developments  are  likely  to  have
reinforced European firms’ technological position and thus spurred innovation
in the medium and long term. Our results confirm that, once barriers to the free
movement of capital, goods and labor had fallen, European firms used M&As
intensively to enter other European markets. Enhancing technology
competencies is found to be one of the main motives for cross-border
acquisitions in the 1990s but was not a factor for domestic acquisitions over the
same period.
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  reviews
related literature. Section 3 describes the data and shows descriptive statistics.
Section 4 presents our empirical approach, and Section 5 shows the empirical
results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
With merger activities growing in terms of numbers, value and geographical
scope, and competition being increasingly based on technical inventions
(Amable and Verspagen, 1995), the relationship between M&As and
technologies has received increasing attention in the academic literature.
Veugelers (2006) provides an overview of recent advances in the fields of
economics and management. Her survey shows that empirical contributions
investigating the relationship between M&As and technologies are scarce for
Europe (Veugelers, 2006). This is particularly the case for cross-border M&As
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4
(Bertrand and Zuniga, 2006). This section reviews the existing literature on
M&A and innovation and derives implications for cross-border acquisitions.
The industrial organization literature identifies enhances in market power by
means of increasing barriers to entry (Comanor, 1967) and efficiency
enhancements by reducing transaction costs (Williamson, 1975) as incentives
for mergers. Those effects can be carried forward to explain motives for
technology-related M&As. Merging partners can profit from economies of scale
and  scope  in  technology  creation  (Cassiman  et  al.,  2005);  and  the  level  of
spillovers  from  research  and  development  (R&D)  investment  is  expected  to
increase with collaboration (D’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Arrow, 1962).
A merger provides the opportunity to reorganize and integrate both firms’
research units (Banal-Estanol and Seldeslachts, 2005), hence enabling
duplication of research to be avoided (Veugelers, 2006). Technology M&As for
market power reasons aim at reducing technology competition (Arrow, 1962;
Reinganum, 1983) and pre-empting comp tition in technology markets (Grimpe
and Hussinger, 2008).
From a more managerial perspective, technology-motivated acquisitions can
enable the acquiring firm to gain or regain contact to the research frontier in
their field of competence (Kamien, 1992). Overlapping research fields can
necessitate the ownership of patents to continue research activities
(O’Donoghue et al., 1998). M&As can enable one firm to acquire the patent
portfolio of a rival (Lerner et al., 2003; Giuri et al., 20062). Further, firms can
use M&As to enter new technology fields in order to reduce risk through
technological diversification. A certain degree of technological diversification is
2 Giuri et al. (2006) find that 20% of the patent applications at the European Patent Office
(EPO) are filed to block competitors.
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necessary to keep up with rapid technology advances. Knowledge in non-core
technologies helps firms to understand emerging technological opportunities
and to jump onto promising new technology trends (Granstrand and Sjölander,
1990, Cantwell et al., 2004). Technological knowledge in ancillary fields on top
of distinctive core competencies enables firms to adopt and integrate
technologies developed by external suppliers and competitors. Given the
growing importance of timing in innovation and fierce technology competition
it is not always possible for firms to build up their own competencies within a
convenient time frame. Hence, M&As appear to be an important instrument for
securing a competitive advantage or for catching up with current technology
standards. The opening up of European markets gave firms a unique opportunity
to search beyond national borders for promising M&A partners in order to
strengthen their position in technology competition at home and abroad.
Keeping in mind that knowledge flows tend to be significantly stronger
within countries than across borders (Jaffe et al., 1993; Eaton and Kortum,
1999; Branstetter, 2001), M&As are held to be of particular importance for
cross-border technology acquisitions. Global technology sourcing has been
found  to  be  crucial  for  securing  competitive  advantages  (Driffield  and  Love,
2005; Sofka, 2005) as firms can realize significant technology spillovers from
industrialized economies (van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Lichtenberg,
2001; Love, 2003; Driffield and Love, 2005; Sofka, 2005). M&A as one way of
foreign direct investment (FDI) is an effective instrument to access foreign
technological capabilities and knowledge (Neary, 2004; Kuemmerle, 1999).
The opening of European markets stimulated engagement in FDI (Petroulas,
2007) and hence M&As. In a recent study, Bertrand and Zitouna (2008),
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however, fail to find differences between European cross-border M&As and
domestic  M&As  with  respect  to  profits  and  productive  efficiency.  They
attribute these findings to European integration.
Arguing that technology sourcing could have been the key factor for
European cross-border M&As, our study explores a sample of European M&As
over the 1994-2000 period. To the best of our knowledge, there is no firm-level
evidence on the importance of technologies for the formation of cross-border
acquisitions. For the industry level, Bertrand and Zuniga (2006) find that cross-
border mergers stimulate R&D activities in targets’ home countries for OECD
countries. This suggests that cross-border M&As impact on firm-level R&D as
well and hence underlines the need for a firm-level investigation in order to
improve our understanding of the role of technologies in cross-border
acquisitions.
3 Data Description and Descriptive Statistics
Our main source of data is Thomson Financial’s SDC Global Mergers and
Acquisitions database, which provides information on M&As valued at $1
million or more announced worldwide. Thomson collects information on M&A
and the financial assets of the firms involved from a variety of sources such as
financial newspapers, Reuters Textline, the Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones and
others. Our sample contains the EU-15 countries, Norway and Switzerland.
Missing information on total assets and intangible assets was supplemented
from the Amadeus firm database maintained by Bureau van Dijk Electronic
Publishing, Brussels, which contains financial information for European firms.3
3 The Amadeus database contains financial information on public and private companies in 41
European countries.
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7
To obtain information on the technology portfolios of the merging firms, we
linked the firm data to the European Patent Office’s (EPO) patent database,
which contains every patent application since the EPO was founded in 1977.
The patent data includes names and addresses of patent applicants as well as the
application date and the technology classes a patent contributed to according to
the International Patent Classification (IPC) system. The link between the
databases was supported by a computerized text-based search algorithm using
information on firm names and addresses (street, zip code, city and country).
Each match suggested by the program was checked manually.
We restrict our sample to public firms as the Thomson merger database does
not guarantee a complete listing of private firms involved in M&As. A second
reason for our exclusive focus on public firms is that our empirical model
requires financial information that is often not available for small and private
firms. The restricted sample is intended to cover a major share of patenting
firms involved in M&As as large firms are responsible for the majority of
patent applications (Giuri et al., 2006).
The final sample consists of 420 M&A deals in the 1994-2000 period in
which both M&A partners are European public firms. The descriptive statistics
presented in Table 1 reveal some interesting insights regarding the variables of
interest. First of all, in terms of total assets, buying firms are, on average, three
times as large as acquisition targets. The average difference between acquirers
and targets in terms of intangible assets4 over total assets is, by contrast,
relatively small. Intangible assets can increase the attractiveness of a potential
4 Intangible assets are defined by Thomson SDC Platinum as: Value of assets having no
physical existence, yet having substantial value to the firm, including goodwill, patents,
trademarks, copyrights, franchises and costs in excess of net book value of businesses acquired,
as of the date of the most recent financial information prior to the announcement of the
transaction.
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8
target for acquiring firms as they may include important trademarks, copyrights
and franchises. A significant part of the mergers 59% (36%, 26%) occur
between firms affiliated with the same industry sector at the two-(three-, four-)
digit SIC level, indicating the importance of product markets for M&As.
Furthermore, 23% of the merger deals occur between innovative firms, in
the sense that both firms applied for an EPO patent at least once in the pre-
merger period. Based on patent information, we calculate technological
proximity Tij of  the  patent  portfolios  of  the  M&A  partners i and j as the
uncentered correlation measure introduced to the patent literature by Jaffe
(1986):
)')('(
'
jjii
ji
ij FFFF
FF
T = . (1)
The acquiring and target firms’ technology portfolios are described by Fi and
Fj. Tij assume values somewhere between 0 (geometrically, the vectors are
rectangular) and 1 (the vectors span an angle of 0 degrees), where 1
corresponds to a 100% overlap of the technology fields in which the merging
partners are active. The patent portfolios are proxied by the firms’ patent stocks
in different technology classes:
ittiit nsapplicatiopatentPSPS _)1(1, +-= - d . (2)
The constant depreciation rate of knowledge d is set to 0.15, as is common
in the literature (e.g. Hall, 1990). Based on the Fraunhofer patent classification,
we distinguish 30 patent stocks in 30 different technology classes for acquiring
firms i, ),...,,( 3021 iiii PSPSPSF =  and acquisition targets j,
),...,,( 3021 jjjj PSPSPSF = . In order to assure that size differences of the patent
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9
portfolio do not bias the proximity measure, we measure the patent stocks per
technology class as a percentage of the total patent stock of target and acquirer.
Table 1 shows that acquiring firms have a significantly larger average patent
stock than acquisition targets. There is little difference between domestic and
cross-border M&As in the average value of the proximity measure. However,
24% of the cross-border deals occur between firms with a technological overlap
in patent portfolios larger than zero, whereas at 17% this share is smaller for
cross-border deals.
Insert Table 1 here
In total, the share of cross-border mergers in our sample is 38%.5 Figure 1
shows that the percentage of announced cross-border M&As in our sample
increased after 1994, but did not vary significantly over the following years.
This pattern of our sample of public firms only reflects the development of all
M&As, including M&As among private firms, in the countries of our interest
(EU-15, Norway and Switzerland) registered in Thomson Financial, as is shown
by Figure 2; this figure also indicates a slight increase in the number of M&As
in the early 1990s, and a decrease in M&A activiti s after 1999.
Insert Figure 1 here
Insert Figure 2 here
Table 2 in the Appendix shows the distribution of M&As in our cross-country
sample. Of 420 M&A deals, 96 took place between public firms in the UK, 40
between French, 30 between German and 20 between Italian firms. With
respect to cross-border deals, Table 2 shows that public firms in the UK, France
and Germany were also most active in acquiring foreign public firms and most
5 The share is even larger if we account for M&As between European and non-European firms.
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of the acquisition targets were from those countries. According to Table 1,
almost 70% of all M&As and 20% of the cross-border deals took place in
between countries with the same language. Sharing the same language
facilitates M&A negotiations and post-merger integration and reduces the costs
of running a business (DiGiovanni, 2005). Further, geographical distance
between M&A firms is likely to correlate with the distance in corporate culture.
The distance between two countries can also be seen as a measure for the
physical costs of trade (DiGiovanni, 2005). We proxy geographical distance by
the distance between the capital cities of both M&A partners’ home countries.
In addition to a dummy for cross-bordership, a common language indicator and
a distance measure, we use macroeconomic indicators to account for relative
country advantages of the target’s countries over the acquiring firm’s country
that potentially help explain cross-border mergers:6
- GDP  (at  current  prices)  measures  the  size  of  the  target  firm’s  national
market.
- Average unit labor costs (ULC) in the manufacturing sector are an
indication of the target firm’s production cost in its local market.
- R&D spending over GDP accounts for the target firm countries’ technology
intensity. On the one hand, R&D-intensive countries can be attractive for
technology sourcing firms eager to learn. On the other hand, R&D intensive
firms might acquire targets in countries with a relatively low R&D intensity
in order to siphon off profits from their technologies (Dunning, 1988).
6 Most  data  is  from  the  OECD.  However,  tax  information  is  taken  from  the  European
Commission (2005). For Switzerland, Norway and Greece, tax data is provided by Chris
Edwards  of  the  Cato  Institute,  based  on  KPMG  data.
Http://www.cato.org/research/fiscal_policy/facts/tax_charts.html
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- The openness of an economy is defined as the sum of its exports and import
volume over GDP, hence indicating its accessibility by trade.
- Lastly, the top statutory tax rates on corporate income account for the tax
advantages of the target’s home country over the acquirer’s home country.
All country variables are measured relative to the acquiring firm’s home country
in order to control for comparative advantages of the target’s home market.
Table  1  shows  that  the  mean  values  of  the  relative  country  characteristics  are
close to one, which means that there is little difference between the countries of
the acquiring and target firm with respect to those variables. T-tests, however,
show that the means are statistically significantly different from one at the 1%
level of statistical significance; for relative UCL, at the 5% level. This indicates
that the target firm’s country is, on average, larger, more R&D-intensive, more
expensive in terms of labor costs and taxes and more open than the acquiring
firm’s home country.
4 Empirical Model
As it is difficult to assess the direct impact of M&As on innovation behavior
(Veugelers, 2005)7, our empirical model investigates the expected value from
acquiring technological assets (Hall, 1988a). We analyze the decision to acquire
a certain firm depending on its assets and characteristics.
Following Hall (1988a), firms are defined in a hedonic way as bundles of their
assets, characteristics and relative home country (dis-)advantages X. The value
of a target firm V is a function of X. In the presence of efficient markets and full
information, V(Xi) equals the price at which i’s asset bundle is traded.
7 For example, a post-merger increase in R&D can indicate duplicated research efforts in the
integration phase or exploitation of synergies; and decreases in post-merger R&D can indicate
an efficiency or a market power effect. In addition, those effects are transitory and it is even
more difficult to identify lon-term effects of M&As.
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Acquisitions,  however,  take  place  at  a  significant  positive  premium  over  pre-
announcement stock value (Jensen and Ruback, 1983) indicating that some
agents place a higher value on a firm's assets bundle Xi than the market. The
acquiring firm is assumed to act as a bidder. A new bid above the current
trading price occurs because the acquiring firm has revealed new information
about the value of the potential acquisition target’s assets. It is, further, assumed
that an acquiring firm j can acquire any other firm i. If an acquisition occurs, the
increment to the value of firm j is Vj (Xi). Thus, j acquires i if j 's net gain from
the acquisition of i is positive and larger than the net gain from a merger with
any other potential target k:
0
,      .
j i i
j i i j k k
V (X )- P
V (X )- P >V (X )- P k C
>
" Î
(3)
Pj denotes the price of i’s assets and C refers to the entire pool of firms.
An advantage of the model is that prices are endogenous in the sense that
the price paid for a certain target varies depending on the potential acquirer.
The  price  at  which  firms  value  the  target  is  assumed  to  be  a  function  of  the
target firm's characteristics V(Xi). Separating j’s net profit from the acquisition
into observable and unobservable components yields:
( )j i i j ijV (X )- P = f X , X e+ , (4)
Assuming that the error terms eij are independent and homoscedastic, (4) can
be estimated by a conditional logit model:
k C
exp( ( ))
P( buys )
exp( ( ))
i j
k j
f X , X
j i C
f X , X
Î
=
å
,    (5)
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where the value function f is specified as the difference between the valuation
of the acquiring firm vj and the equilibrium price v at which the firm’s assets
will be traded:
( ) ( ( ) ( ))i j j i if X ,  X v X - v X= .     (6)
Small letters correspond to the observable components of V and Vj. The
value function f(Xi, Xj), including the characteristics of the acquiring and target
firm and the distance between them in characteristics space, is specified as:
1 2( ) v( )j i i i j iv X X b X b X - X- = + .
8          (7)
The vector of characteristics X includes  the  target’s  total  assets  and
intangible assets, the difference in total assets and intangible assets over total
assets between the M&A partners, a control variable for being in the same two-,
three and four-digit SIC industry and relative country characteristics as defined
in the previous section. In addition, the patent stock of acquisition targets and
the overlap of the merging firms’ technology portfolios account for the
attractiveness of innovative assets and the effect of technological relatedness on
the conditional probability of becoming acquired. Technological proximity is
taken into account separately for domestic and cross-border deals in order to
test whether the importance of technology assets differs between domestic and
cross-border acquisitions.9
The estimation of the model above is problematic because it is assumed that
an acquiring firm can choose the acquisition target from a huge pool of possible
acquisition targets including every public firm in Europe. This huge set of
choices causes technical problems for the estimation. For this reason, a subset
8 Harrison (2006) uses a similar model to investigate hospital merger formation.
9 The assets and characteristics of the acquiring firm cancel each other out through the
econometric implementation of the model.
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of alternative targets is chosen as a random subsample of the unchosen
alternative M&A targets (McFadden, 1978). For our application, we draw
groups of thirty alternative targets10 for  every  year  from  a  sample  of  public
firms in Europe which is taken from the Amadeus database.11 M&A firms that
were involved in a merger in that same year are excluded from the pool of
potential acquisition targets. The final data set contains the actual targets as well
as thirty alternative targets for each M&A deal: 420 actual M&A deals plus 420
x 30 control transactions.
Lastly, a valid application of a conditional logit model requires
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), i.e. that the relative odds ratios
between any two decision outcomes are independent of the number and nature
of other alternatives being simultaneously considered. In the present context,
IIA implies that adding firms to or subtracting them from the pool of acquisition
targets does not influence the actual choice of the M&A partner. In order to test
whether IIA is valid, we apply a Hausman test for the null hypothesis that the
estimated coefficients of the model do not differ systematically if only a
subsample of 20 alternative M&A targets is considered. The null hypothesis
cannot be rejected and the conditional logit can be applied in our context (see
bottom of Table 3 for the test results).
10 Hall (1988b) investigates how the size of the control group affects the outcome of conditional
logit models. She finds that an increase in the number of observations from 7 to 50 leads to an
efficiency gain of about 30 percent based on a comparison of the standard errors.
11 As the number of public limited companies per country provided by the Amadeus database
does not match the stock exchange statistics provided by the World Federation of Exchanges,
we  put  the  restriction  on  our  sampling  routine  to  randomly  draw  a  percentage  of  firms  from
every country according to the stock exchanges’ overall figures.
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5 Estimation Results
The estimation results of the conditional logit model for the choice of the
acquisition target are presented in Table 3. The coefficients describe how the
target’s assets and characteristics affect the probability of being acquired. In
order  to  show  that  our  results  are  robust  with  respect  to  the  randomly  drawn
control group of alternative M&A targets, we present the regression results for
two different control groups of alternative acquisition targets. The estimated
coefficients are robust for the different control groups.12
With respect to technological assets, the regression results show that the
expected net gain from an acquisition decreases the larger the patent stock of
the acquisition target is. This finding is in line with Hall (1988a), who finds a
negative impact of the R&D intensity on the probability of being acquired. A
possible explanation is that firms with a large patent stock are more expensive
than comparable firms without patents. The net value of an acquisition of an
inventive firm for the acquiring firm is hence likely to be relatively low
compared to the net value of firms with few or no patents if the acquiring firm
is not explicitly aiming for the target’s technologies. Another possible
explanation is that patents might facilitate market-based technology licensing
rather than firm acquisitions.
Focusing on the attractiveness of cross-border targets in an integrated
market, our results show that acquisitions across borders are more attractive
than domestic M&As. As expected, this effect is larger for M&A targets in
countries that share the same language and decreases in inverse proportion to
the distance between the countries. Speaking the same language and having a
12 We also estimated a nested logit model as an additional robustness check. The results were
very similar.
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related corporate culture reduces the expected costs of running a business. The
coefficients for the relative country characteristics of acquiring firms’ and target
firms’ home countries show the expected signs. Acquiring firms are interested
in accessing relatively large (in terms of GDP) national markets. Furthermore,
countries with relatively high taxes and relatively open economies are less
attractive than others. This suggests that as open economies can be served by
exports, it is not always necessary to acquire national firms in order to obtain
market access. There is no robust effect for the relative R&D intensity of the
target country.
To test whether acquisitions across borders have a technology/related
motivation, we introduce two variables for technological relatedness of the
patent portfolios of the merging partners: one for domestic M&As and one for
cross-border deals. The results show that foreign firms with related patents are
even more attractive than cross-border acquisitions in general. Related patents
and expertise strengthen the technology competencies of the merged entity, and
the merged firm can benefit from economies of scale and scope in technology
and internalize spillovers. The integration of technology departments can be
very fruitful wherever the technology portfolios are similar because both firms
should  have  the  necessary  specific  absorptive  capacity  to  make  use  of  each
other’s knowledge. Moreover, a target firm in the same technology field can be
attractive as the acquiring firm can gain access to important intellectual
property  rights,  which  can  be  necessary  to  continue  research  on  a  particular
technology or to gain or regain contact to the research frontier through M&As.
Technology relatedness is, however, only important for cross-border M&As,
whereas it is not a factor in domestic M&As. This suggests that national M&As
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are not intended to strengthen technology competencies in the first place in that
period. One reason might be that domestic technology markets are already
largely consolidated and that firms take advantage of the newly launched
integrated market in the 1990s to strengthen their position in international
technology competition through acquisitions. Moreover, domestic M&As fall
under the jurisdiction of national competition authorities, who have the right to
prohibit proposed mergers if the market share of the merged firm exceeds the
thresholds of national merger guidelines, which are typically below those set by
European competition authorities. Although market shares are defined with
respect to product markets rather than technology markets, firms with related
technologies are likely to also be active in the same product markets. Another
reason why related technologies are not important for domestic M&As may be
found in national/regional rivalries. Firms in fierce national competition are
more likely to expand their capabilities through foreign acquisitions in order to
defend their national market shares than to collaborate.
Thus, the empirical finding that technological relatedness is important for
cross-border mergers but not for domestic M&As illustrates the importance of
technologies for reorganizing the integrated European market in the 1990s.
Insert Table 3 here
With respect to the control variables it turns out that firm size as measured
in logarithms of total assets (Log(A)), for example, has a significant positive
impact on the probability of becoming acquired. This reflects the fact that the
1994-2000 period saw growth in the number and value of M&A deals
(Sleuwaegen and Valentini, 2006) and is referred to as a period of “mega
mergers” for Europe (Kleinert and Klodt, 2000). The positive relationship
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between firm size and the probability of becoming acquired can reflect not only
market power objectives but also better access to refinancing from banks and
international capital markets. A large gap between the acquiring firm and the
target firm in terms of size, defined as the difference between their log total
assets (DlogA), reduces the likelihood of a merger. Further, there is no robust,
significant effect of the target’s intangible assets over total assets (I/A) and the
distance in that ratio between acquirer and target (DI/A). Lastly, not
surprisingly, the regression results show the importance of output market
relatedness for the acquisition decision (Hall, 1988a; Cassiman et al. 2005).
Firms in the same two-digit SIC industry sector are more likely to become
acquired than firms in another industry. The effect is even larger when the
target is active in the same more narrowly defined industry sector, such as in the
same three-digit and four-digit SIC industry. Hence, there were no tendencies to
form conglomerates through M&As in the 1990s, unlike in the 1980s.
6 Discussion
Following the establishment of European Economic and Monetary Union,
M&As across European borders became an important tool for reorganization of
the European market (WIR, 2000, Kleinert and Klodt, 2000, Sleuwaegen and
Valentini, 2006). The figures confirm significant cross-border M&A activities
by European public firms in the 1994-2000 period, after the Maastricht Treaty
had significantly reduced existing barriers between European countries and put
a concrete face on the single European currency. We find cross-border M&As
to be more attractive than domestic firm acquisitions in that period, for which
the new opportunities of the integrated European market may serve as an
explanation. Involvement in M&A activity, however, varies significantly across
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countries, and national differences in corporate cultures, capital markets and
other economic conditions play a major role in M&A formation. This hints at
further potential for integration in Europe.
Another aim of the establishment of the European Economic and Monetary
Union was to spur innovation and to foster the emergence of European
innovative firms in order to enhance Europe’s ability to compete with the US
and Asia. Our results suggest that European firms enhanced their technological
competencies across European borders through firm acquisitions in the 1994-
2000 period. European economic harmonization and the facilitation of the
emergence of European innovative firms thanks to monetary union, thereby
making Europe more competitive, are two possible reasons.
A limitation  of  this  study  is  that  we  cannot  compare  M&A activities  after
1993 with earlier periods since we do not have access to time series of
sufficient length. However, we can refer to previous studies that showed an
increase in cross-border mergers in the 1990s (e.g. WIR, 2000) and an increase
in FDI after the introduction of the euro (Petroulas, 2007). We are also unable
to show whether a shift in acquisition strategi s took place following the
opening up of markets. Lastly, it would be interesting to see if European
integration  has  a  positive  effect  on  R&D  activities,  as  the  expected  benefits
might not match the actual benefits (Stoneman, 1978).
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Acquiring Firms
(420 observations)
Target Firms
(420 observations)
Mean (Std. dev.) Mean (Std. dev.)
Total assets 7,213.33 (16,466.12) 1,761.96 (4,735.63)
Intangible assets
over capital assets*100 4.49 (8.86) 3.05 (9.07)
Patent stock 132.41 (772.41) 20.46 (15.14)
Relations Between Target Firms and Acquirer Firms
Mean (Std. dev.)
Both firms have patents 0.23 (0.40)
Same industry
Two-digit SIC 0.59 (0.49)
Same industry
Three-digit SIC 0.36 (0.48)
Same industry
Four-digit SIC 0.26 (0.44)
Technological proximity 0.10 (0.26)
Cross-border 0.38 (0.49)
Technological proximity
(domestic deals) 0.06 (0.20)
Technological proximity
(cross-border deals) 0.05 (0.18)
Relations Between Target Countries and Acquirer Countries
Mean (Std. dev.)
Same language 0.69 (0.46)
Distance between capitals 235.65 (373.97)
Relative ULC 1.00 (0.11)
Relative GDP 2.15 (6.14)
Relative R&D/GDP 1.02 (0.31)
Relative tax 1.02 (0.23)
Relative openness 1.01 (0.31)
All financial variables are measured in US$ million and are of the most recent date available prior to
the announcement of the transaction.
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Figure 1: Share of Cross-Border M&A in Our Sample
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Figure 2: Development of the Number European Cross-Border and Total
M&A According to Thomson Financial (3-year moving average)13
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13 A 3-year moving average is used to account for the volatility of merger activities. For this
reason we lose two years of observation. Furthermore, we omit the years 1982-1986 because the
number of M&A reported by Thomson Financial seems to be incomplete for these years.
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Table 2: Distribution of M&As Across Countries
Cross-border deals
Country
Domestic deals
Acquiring firms Acquisition targets
AT 3 4 5
BE 2 6 4
CH 4 11 6
DE 30 21 27
DK 6 4 2
ES 4 6 11
FI 6 9 7
FR 40 24 14
GR 17 2 1
IE 2 10 1
IT 20 9 7
LU 0 1 0
NL 8 9 10
NO 3 4 10
PT 7 3 7
SE 13 16 17
UK 96 20 30
# of firms 2*261 159 159
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Table 3: Conditional Logit Estimation for the Acquisition Choice
Control Group 1 Control Group 2
Coefficient
(std. err.)
Coefficient
(std. err.)
DLog(A) -0.68 *** -0.64 ***
(0.10) (0.10)
D(I/A) -0.65 -6.81 **
(2.43) (3.27)
Log(A) 0.63 *** 0.82 ***
(0.09) (0.10)
I/A 0.61 6.86 **
(2.25) (3.03)
Same industry 2.38 *** 1.98 ***
(2dgt-SIC) (0.28) (0.30)
Same industry 0.68 1.25 ***
(3dgt-SIC) (0.44) (0.50)
Same industry 2.41 *** 1.15 *
(4dgt-SIC) (0.62) (0.60)
Patent stock/100 -0.004 *** -0.007 ***
(0.001) (0.001)
Cross-border 7.01 *** 8.92 ***
(1.59) (1.79)
Tech. proximity 4.37 *** 3.44 ***
Cross-border (0.81) (0.73)
Tech. proximity 2.48 0.25
Domestic (1.68) (1.75)
Log(distance) -1.24 **** -1.69 ***
(0.46) (0.29)
Same language 1.60 *** 1.04 **
(0.46) (0.49)
Relative ULC -0.06 -1.27
(1.08) (4.25)
Relative R&D/GDP -0.58 ** 0.20
(0.33) (0.37)
Relative GDP 0.08 ** 0.07
(0.05) (0.05)
Relative tax -4.89 *** -3.77 ***
(0.61) (0.65)
Relative openness -3.40 *** -3.87 ***
(0.42) (1.53)
LR-C2 statistic 2,372.66 2,449.70
Log L -255.94 -217.42
observations 13,020 13,020
Hausman test for the validity of IIA
H0: the estimated coefficients of the model with 30 alternative M&A targets do not differ
systematically from an estimation of the model based on only 20 alternatives
C2-stat=7.41 C2-stat=17.10
All variables which are not interaction terms or relative measures map the characteristics of
the target firms.
Financial variables are measured in US$ million and are of the most recent date available prior
 to the announcement of the transaction.
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
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